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It Just Makes Sense: An Argument for a
Uniform Objective Standard for
Incarcerated Individuals Bringing
Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Pearce Thomson Embrey *
Abstract
In July 2020, the New York Times published an article on a
Department of Justice report detailing the systematic abuse of
incarcerated individuals by prison guards within the State of
Alabama’s Department of Corrections. This report evidences the
challenges faced by incarcerated individuals seeking to vindicate
their Eighth Amendment rights. In a legal sense, those individuals
who turn to the court system for relief face an almost
insurmountable burden of proof. This Note begins by surveying the
history of excessive force claims under the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as deliberate indifference claims
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This Note then
analyzes the success rates of Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims depending on whether the circuit applies a
purely objective standard or a standard with both an objective and
a subjective component. Upon the basis of these findings, this Note
concludes by advocating for the adoption of a single pronged,
objective standard for all individuals seeking to challenge the
conditions of their confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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I. Introduction
On July 24, 2020, the New York Times published an article
discussing a report issued by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
detailing the systematic abuse of inmates by prison guards within
the State of Alabama’s Department of Corrections (“ADOC”). 1 In
the report itself, the DOJ uncovered numerous instances in which
prison guards used excessive force, with each falling into one of
three broad categories. 2
The first category was the use of excessive force against
constrained or compliant prisoners. 3 For example, in December
1. See Neil Vigdor, Routine Beatings of Inmates in Alabama Prisons Go
Ignored, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2020 (recounting various incidents of
prisoner abuse perpetrated by officers of the Alabama Department of Corrections
uncovered by the Department of Justice) [https://perma.cc/2VKJ-Y4LG].
2. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Letter on Investigation of Alabama’s
State Prisons for Men, at 10–16 (July 23, 2020) (enumerating instances in which
prison guards used excessive force and dividing those instances into three
categories: excessive force on prisoners who are restrained or who are compliant;
unlawful force as punishment or retribution; using chemical spray
inappropriately).
3. See id. at 10 (“Using force on a restrained or compliant prisoner who is
no longer resisting or presenting a danger is unconstitutional. Correctional
officers’ use of this kind of unlawful force is a pattern and happens too frequently
in Alabama’s prisons.”); see also Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1576 (11th
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2018, a correctional officer punched, kicked, and beat with an
extendable baton a handcuffed prisoner in the facility’s medical
unit. 4 During the incident, the officer reportedly yelled, “I am the
reaper of death, now say my name!” 5 A nurse at the scene saw the
prison guard “place his palms against the wall and his foot on the
side of the prisoner’s face to grind the prisoner’s head into the
floor.” 6 A group of nurses eventually intervened, and the
correctional officer, appearing agitated, paced back and forth while
covered in the prisoner’s blood. 7 After telling witnesses that they
“had not seen anything,” the prison guard left the medical unit and
subsequently lied in his report, alleging that he never hit the
inmate. 8
Additionally, in February 2019, a prison guard caught two
inmates jumping one of the external perimeter fences. 9 The guard
handcuffed the two prisoners and took them into an observation
room located across the hall from an office in which three other
correctional officers were working. 10 A sergeant working in the
office became enraged upon reviewing the security footage of the
two prisoners hopping the fence. 11 The sergeant took the key to the
observation room and pulled one of the two handcuffed prisoners

Cir. 1991) (noting that officers violate the Eighth Amendment if the officers
continue to use force after the necessity for the coercive action has ceased).
4. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 2, at 11 (“Two nurses saw the officer
beat the prisoner, and two other nurses could hear the beating from adjacent
rooms. The prisoner did not antagonize the officer before the beating and his
hands were handcuffed behind his back.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. (“The nurse intervened, and the officer briefly removed his foot
from the prisoner’s head. When the officer tried to step on the prisoner’s head
again, the nurse sternly told the officer to calm down.”).
8. See id. (“The officer filed a false incident report stating that he did not
hit the prisoner. The body chart and photographs, however, documented clear
swelling and abrasions to the prisoner’s back and left arm, a bloody nose, and a
gouge to his left shin.”).
9. See id. at 10 (“[A] correctional officer at Elmore saw two prisoners jump
a fence to retrieve contraband . . . .”).
10. See id. (“A lieutenant in the office handcuffed the two prisoners and took
them to an observation room across the hall from the office.”).
11. See id. (explaining the officer’s reaction to security footage of the two
prisoners hopping the fence).
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out into the hallway. 12 The sergeant then shoved the prisoner
against the wall, knocking him to the floor, and then beat the
prisoner with a baton nineteen times across his entire body. 13 The
prisoner defecated himself during the course of the correctional
officer’s assault. 14 The sergeant also pulled the second handcuffed
prisoner from the observation room and struck him three times
with the baton, causing the prisoner to collapse to the floor. 15 Four
other correctional officers were in the immediate vicinity of, or
directly witnessed, this assault. 16
The second category was the use of excessive force as
punishment or retribution. 17 One notable incident in July 2017
involved a correctional officer witnessing an inmate working in the
facility’s kitchen give another inmate some leftover chicken to
eat. 18 The prison guard took the working inmate to the back of the
kitchen and forced him to eat all of the remaining leftover chicken;
when the prisoner could not do so, the officer slapped him three
times. 19

12. See id. at 11 (demonstrating the officer’s actions after entering the room
with the prisoners).
13. See id. (“The sergeant punched and kicked the prisoner, and then struck
the prisoner with a collapsible baton approximately [nineteen] times on his head,
legs, arms, back, and body.”).
14. See id. (detailing the beating of the prisoner and explaining how the
prisoner defecated himself as a result).
15. See id. at 10–11 (“When the prisoner slid to the floor, the sergeant
continued striking him, landing blows to his arms, legs, and abdomen. He also
kicked the prisoner as he lay on the floor.”).
16. See id. at 11 (“Four other ADOC employees . . . watched or were in the
immediate vicinity of the beatings but failed to intervene, either verbally or
physically. The sergeant who assaulted the prisoners later filed a false report
about the incident.”).
17. See id. at 14 (“ADOC’s correctional officers often use force to punish
prisoners when the prisoner’s response or behavior may not accord with the
officer’s commands, even though the prisoner does not physically resist or present
a reasonably perceived threat to others.”).
18. See id. at 15 (describing an occasion in which an officer used unlawful
force as punishment or retribution).
19. See id. (“When the captain questioned the lieutenant and officer about
the incident, they admitted to forcing the prisoner to eat the chicken. It is unclear
whether additional force was used on the prisoner.”).
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The final category was the inappropriate use of chemical
spray. 20 The DOJ reported that ADOC officers had a propensity to
use chemical spray as a form of retribution, which according to the
agency is a per se violation of the prisoners’ constitutional rights:
“[W]here chemical agents are used unnecessarily, without
penological justification, or for the very purpose of punishment or
harm, that use satisfies the Eighth Amendment’s objective harm
requirement.” 21 The two specific incidents cited in the DOJ’s report
occurred after prisoners refused to comply with instructions
regarding the doors to their own “dormitories.” 22 In one instance,
the officer sprayed a prisoner with a chemical agent while
simultaneously hitting the prisoner on the legs with a baton; in the
other, the officer deployed chemical spray onto a noncompliant
inmate’s underwear and genitals. 23 The DOJ noted that neither
officer was disciplined even after both facility captains determined
that their officer’s use of chemical agents was unjustified. 24
Although the DOJ readily acknowledges that these instances
of excessive force are unconstitutional, relief for these incarcerated
individuals is not so easily attainable. 25 Practically speaking, the
conditions of confinement in Alabama prisons are unlikely to
improve without some sort of external intervention due to the

20. See id. (“ADOC’s regulation governing the use of chemical agents
generally provides that they may be deployed in order to gain control of a
situation. But ADOC correctional officers often ignore ADOC’s regulation and use
chemical spray inappropriately. Prisoners who do not present a danger are
frequently sprayed with chemical agents.”).
21. See id. (quoting Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010)).
22. See id. at 15–16 (detailing how an inmate disobeyed a correctional
officer’s order to close the door to his own dormitory resulting in retaliation).
23. See id. at 16 (citing that the officer sprayed the inmate’s genitals through
the tray door because the prisoner refused to step away from the door after the
officer instructed).
24. See id. (“It is also common for officers in Alabama’s prisons to use
chemical spray on prisoners in locked cells. These uses of force often occur when
prisoners place their arm in a tray door, even though the prisoners are secure in
a cell and pose no danger to others.”).
25. See id. at 1 (“[T]here is reasonable cause to believe . . . :(1) the conditions
throughout Alabama’s prisons for men violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution; and (2) these violations are pursuant to a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of rights protected by the Eighth Amendment.”)
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ADOC’s refusal to hold its officers accountable internally. 26 In a
legal sense, individuals turning to the courts face an almost
insurmountable burden of proof to be entitled to relief. 27
This Note suggests that the standard of proof for incarcerated
individuals bringing excessive force claims under the Eighth
Amendment needs to be reevaluated and proceeds in the following
fashion. Part II surveys the history of excessive force claims under
the Fourth, 28 Eighth, 29 and Fourteenth 30 Amendments. 31 Part III
explains deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 32 Lastly, Part IV analyzes the success
rates of deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment depending on whether the petitioner faces a purely
objective standard or a standard with both an objective and a
subjective component. 33 This Note concludes by proposing that, on
the basis of these findings, the federal judiciary ought to strongly
consider adopting a uniform objective standard that would apply
to all conditions of confinement claims, whether brought by a
pretrial detainee or by an incarcerated individual. 34
II. Excessive Force Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
An individual in custody may bring a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert that some aspect of their confinement is
26. See id. at 16–17 (“ADOC does not routinely review uses of force to
identify officers who may have a history or pattern of excessive force allegations[,]
[n]or does [it] have a centralized system to track officers who are repeatedly
investigated for using force.”).
27. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (holding that a prisoner
bringing an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment must show that
“the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind” and that the use
of force was objectively unreasonable (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298,
303 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable search and
seizures).
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishments).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (forbidding the State to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law).
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part V.
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constitutionally deficient. 35 The text of § 1983 specifically states
that “[e]very person who, under the color of any
statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .” 36 However, “the conditions of confinement of pretrial
detainees are not analyzed under the standard of whether the
conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment because,
unlike convicted prisoners, the government has no right to punish
pretrial detainees at all.” 37 As such, while the conditions of
confinement for convicted prisoners are analyzed under the Eighth
Amendment, those same conditions for a pretrial detainee are
analyzed under the Due Process Clauses of either the Fifth
Amendment 38 or the Fourteenth Amendment. 39
A. Excessive Force Claims Under the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
comprised of just sixteen words: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” 40 The text of the amendment is steeped in
Anglo-American history and tradition, originating in the British
Declaration of Rights of 1688, 41 and making its first American
35. See Jonathan M. Purver & Patricia A. Hageman, Asserting Claims of
Unconstitutional Prison Conditions Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 24 AM. JUR. TRIALS
425 § 1 (last updated Apr. 2022) (1997) (articulating that prisoners can use 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge conditions of their confinement).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
37. Edward J. Hanlon, Proof of Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 24 AM.
JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS 467 § 4 (last updated Feb. 2022) (1994) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1979)).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, property, without due process of law.”).
39. See Hanlon, supra note 37, at § 4 (explaining that a pretrial detainee’s
claim is examined under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41. See James S. Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development
of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 996
at n. 1 (1964) (quoting Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An
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appearance in 1776 within the Virginian Declaration of Rights. 42
Although the Eighth Amendment seems straightforward at first
glance, it has been said that “few constitutional guarantees of
individual liberty have so often been relied upon, to so little avail,
as has the [E]ighth Amendment.” 43
One of the Supreme Court’s first forays into the substance of
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments took place in Robinson v. California. 44 In that case,
Lawrence Robinson was charged in the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles County for violating a statute making it a misdemeanor
for any individual “either to use narcotics, or be addicted to the use
of narcotics . . . .” 45 At trial, the judge gave the jury the following
instruction:
To be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or
condition and not an act. It is a continuing offense and differs from
most other offenses in the fact that (it) is chronic rather than acute;
that it continues after it is complete and subjects the offender to
arrest at any time before he reforms. The existence of such a
chronic condition may be ascertained from a single examination, if
the characteristic reactions of that condition be found present. 46
Robinson was convicted largely based on the testimony
provided by two law enforcement officers, in which they described
the condition of Robinson’s arms, including the existence of scar
tissue and numerous needle marks. 47
The Supreme Court reversed Robinson’s conviction, and in an
opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court noted that
while the State of California could regulate the trafficking of
Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 846 (1961)
(footnotes omitted)).
42. See id. (“It [the terms cruel and unusual] formed a part of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776.”).
43. Id.
44. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1992) (finding that a
California statute which criminalizes the addiction of drugs is cruel and unusual
punishment and violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
45. Id. at 661–62.
46. Id. at 662–63.
47. See id. at 662 (“The officer testified that at that time he had observed
‘scar tissue and discoloration on the inside’ of [Robinson’s] right arm, and ‘what
appeared to be numerous needle marks and a scab which was approximately
three inches below the crook of the elbow’ on [Robinson’s] left arm.”).
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narcotics within its borders under its state police powers, the
California trial court’s interpretation of the statute allowing for the
conviction of individuals who merely appeared to be addicted to
narcotics was not a reasonable application of that power. 48 In a
particularly powerful analogy, the Court wrote that “[i]t is unlikely
that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it
a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to
be afflicted with a venereal disease.” 49 From that position, the
Supreme Court concluded that Robinson’s conviction under the
statute was a cruel and unusual punishment requiring reversal. 50
In 1986, the Supreme Court started to articulate the standard
by which incarcerated individuals may bring excessive force claims
under the Eighth Amendment. 51 In Whitley v. Albers, a prisoner
named Gerald Albers was shot in the left knee by correctional
officers as they attempted to quell a riot at the Oregon State
Penitentiary. 52 Albers suffered severe physical damage to his left
leg, as well as severe mental and emotional distress, and he then
filed a lawsuit under § 1983. 53 The district court found in favor of

48. See id. at 664; 666–67 (“This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes
a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.”).
49. Id. at 666.
50. See id. at 667.
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been
guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment . . .
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment
which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for
the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.
51. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (“The general
requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant alleges and prove the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should also be applied with due regard
for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment
objections is lodged.”).
52. See id. at 314–18 (explaining the facts of the case).
53. See id. at 317 (“[Albers] subsequently commenced this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that petitioners deprived him of his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and raising pendent state law claims for
assault and battery and negligence.”).
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the correctional officers, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in
Robinson v. California, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 54
Tasked with deciding the proper standard under which Albers
could claim that the officers of the Oregon State Penitentiary
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in an opinion authored by Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor. 55 At every preceding level of litigation,
Albers had maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment acted as
a “distinct though overlapping source of substantive protection
from state action involving excessive force” from the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 56
The Supreme Court rejected Albers’ argument, finding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided
Albers with no greater protections than the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 57 The Court
justified its conclusion by saying that “[i]t would indeed be
surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security measures,
conduct that shocks the conscience . . . and so violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, were not also punishment inconsistent
with contemporary standards of decency and repugnant to the

54. See id. at 317–18.
The [Ninth Circuit] held that an Eighth Amendment violation would be
established “if a prison official deliberately shot Albers under circumstances
where the official, with due allowance for the exigency, knew or should have
known that it was unnecessary,” or “if the emergency plan was adopted or carried
out with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the right of Albers to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment.”
55. See id. at 314 (“This case requires us to decide what standard governs a
prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to quell a prison
riot.”).
56. See id. at 326–27 (“The District Court was correct in ruling that
respondent did not assert a procedural due process claim . . . But we believe
respondent did raise a claim that his ‘substantive rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ were infringed by prison officials when he
was shot.”).
57. See id. at 327 (“We think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically
concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal
institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted
prisoners in cases such as this one, where the deliberate use of force is challenge
as excessive unjustified.”).
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conscience of mankind, in violation of the Eighth.” 58 Thus, the
Court determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was an inappropriate vehicle for Albers’ excessive
force claim given the duplicative nature of its protection from the
use of excessive force in comparison with the Eighth Amendment. 59
Seven years later, the Court further refined the standard for
excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment in Hudson v.
McMillian. 60 In that case, the Supreme Court faced the question of
“whether the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does
not suffer a serious injury.” 61 Keith Hudson, an individual
incarcerated in a Louisiana state facility, got into an argument
with a correctional officer named McMillian, with the latter
punching and kicking Hudson repeatedly while he was restrained
in handcuffs and shackles. 62 Hudson later sued McMillian and
others under § 1983 for compensatory damages stemming from the
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. 63 A magistrate judge for
the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana ruled in
favor of Hudson, finding that McMillian “used force when there
was no need to do so and that Mezo expressly condoned their
actions,” but the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision. 64
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Supreme Court, reversing
the Fifth Circuit, held that the use of excessive force could
58. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 173 (1952) (internal
quotations omitted)).
59. See id. (reasoning “that in these circumstances the Due Process Clause
affords no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause”).
60. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (concluding that there
was no Eighth Amendment violation).
61. Id. at 4.
62. See id. (“[Hudson] further testified that [Arthur] Mezo, the supervisor on
duty, watched the beating but merely told the officers ‘not to have too much fun.’”).
63. See id. (“As a result of this beating, Hudson suffered minor bruises and
swelling of his face, mouth and lip. The blows also loosened Hudson’s teeth and
cracked his partial dental plate, rendering it unusable for several months.”).
64. See id. at 5.
[The Fifth Circuit] held that inmates alleging use of excessive force in violation of
the Eighth Amendment must prove: (1) significant injury; (2) resulting “directly
and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need”; (3) the
excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable; and (4) that the action
constituted an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
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constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, even if the victim did not suffer serious injuries. 65
Noting the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” standard
in Whitley v. Albers, the Court declared that “[w]hat is necessary
to establish an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ . . . varies according to the nature of the alleged
constitutional violation.” 66 For example, whenever a petitioner
makes an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, an
inquiry must be made as to “whether the force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously or
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” 67 Additionally,
the Court noted that any malicious and sadistic use of force against
an inmate automatically violates the contemporary standards of
decency, even if the inmate did not suffer a significant injury. 68
Thus, because Hudson’s injuries were not de minimis, the Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Circuit had improperly determined that
his Eighth Amendment claim was unsustainable. 69
B. Excessive Force Claims Under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution says that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . .” 70 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures to be the
vehicle by which non-incarcerated individuals may bring excessive
65. Id. at 4, 12.
66. Id. at 5 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
67. See id. at 5 (“For example, the appropriate inquiry when an inmate
alleges that prison officials failed to attend to serious medical needs is whether
the officials exhibited ‘deliberate indifference.’”).
68. See id. at 9 (“Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any
physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than
some arbitrary quantity of injury.”).
69. See id. at 10 (“Yet the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises,
swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth
Amendment purposes. The extent of Hudson’s injuries thus provides no basis for
dismissal of his § 1983 claim.”).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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force claims against arresting officers. 71 However, as aptly
demonstrated by the Second Circuit’s opinion in Johnson v.
Glick, 72 this was not always the case. 73
Australia Johnson was held in the Manhattan House of
Detention for Men while on trial for several felony offenses. 74 One
evening, a correctional officer named John Fuller informed
Johnson and several other prisoners that the group had failed to
follow his instructions while checking back into the facility after
spending the day in court. 75 Johnson attempted to explain to
Officer Fuller that the inmates had been following the instructions
of another officer, but in response, Officer Fuller struck Johnson
twice in the head while muttering, “I’ll kill you, old man, I’ll break
you in half.” 76 Johnson brought a § 1983 action against Officer
Fuller and the warden of the facility, but the District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed Johnson’s complaint. 77
In an opinion written by Judge Henry Friendly, the Second
Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s
excessive force claim against Officer Fuller. 78 The court’s decision
relied heavily on the following proposition, which Judge Friendly
attributed to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rochin v.
71. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
626 (6th ed. 2019) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
72. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. See id. at 1032 (“The solution lies in the proposition that, both before and
after sentence, constitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to
conduct violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment or . . . of the
Fourth.”).
74. Id. at 1029.
75. See id. (“The complaint was brought against . . . a correction officer,
described in the complaint only as Officer John, Badge No. 1765, but now
identified as John Fuller . . . .”).
76. Id. at 1029–30.
77. See id. at 1030.
Recognizing that there were numerous decisions in other circuits that would seem
to uphold the validity of the complaint as against the officer . . . Judge Knapp
nevertheless dismissed the complaint, saying ‘So far as I am aware no decision in
this circuit requires such a conclusion, and it is one at which I would arrive only
under constraint.
78. See id. (“Although we realize that upholding this complaint may well lead
to considerable further expansion of actions by state prisoners under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 . . . we think the ruling was in error so far as the officer was concerned.”).
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California 79: “[A]pplication of undue force by law enforcement
officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of
law . . . [and] [t]he same principle should extend to the acts of
brutality by correctional officers, although the notion of what
constitutes brutality may not necessarily be the same.” 80 The
Second Circuit then articulated the following four-factor test for
determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed: (1)
“[T]he need for the application of force”; (2) “the relationship
between the need and amount of force that was used”; (3) “the
extent of the injury inflicted”; and (4) “whether force was applied
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.” 81
In the next decade, however, the Supreme Court would use
two cases to reign in federal courts that were evaluating excessive
force claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 82 In the first of these cases, Tennessee v. Garner, 83
Edward Garner was shot and killed by a Memphis police officer
who had ordered Garner to halt, believing that Garner was
attempting to flee the scene of a burglary by crossing a six-foothigh chain-link fence. 84 Although the officer had used a flashlight
to see Garner’s face and hands, he still chose to use deadly force to
prevent Garner from eluding capture. 85 At the time, Tennessee

79. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (determining that law
enforcement’s forced pumping of a suspect’s stomach, to obtain evidence for
prosecution under California state law, violated the suspect’s due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,1032–33 (2d Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 1033.
82. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that a law
enforcement officer’s use of deadly force against a fleeing individual suspected of
committing a criminal misdemeanor was an impermissible seizure under the
Fourth Amendment); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)
(holding that all excessive force claims brought by individuals not convicted of an
offense must be evaluated under a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness
standard).
83. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
84. Id. at 3–4.
85. See id. (“[Officer Hymon] saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not
certain, was ‘reasonably sure’ and ‘figured’ that Garner was unarmed. He thought
Garner was 17 or 18 years old and about 5’5” or 5’7” tall.”).
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state law provided that “[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest
the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use
all the necessary means to effect the arrest.” 86
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Byron
White, held the Tennessee statute unconstitutional as violative of
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
seizures. 87 Obviously, a suspect has a fundamental interest in
protecting their own life, and it is hard to imagine a greater
intrusion into this interest than a seizure through deadly force. 88
Applying this balancing test, the Court concluded that “[t]he use
of deadly force is [not] a sufficiently productive means of
accomplishing [the government’s stated interest in reducing
overall violence] to justify the killing of nonviolent suspects.” 89
Four years later, the Court revisited the issue of excessive
force under the Fourth Amendment in Graham v. Connor. 90 In that
case, a diabetic named Dethorne Graham asked a friend, William
Berry, to drive him to a convenience store so that he could purchase
orange juice to increase his blood sugar. 91 However, there was a
long line at the store, so Graham asked Berry to drive him to a
friend’s house instead. 92 Officer Connor of the Charlotte Police
Department became suspicious when he saw Graham enter and
then quickly exit the convenience store, and he followed Graham
and Berry for about half a mile before making an investigatory
stop. 93 Graham told Connor that he was suffering from a “sugar
reaction,” and when Connor returned to his vehicle to radio
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
87. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 10 (“Without in any way disparaging the
importance of these goals, we are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a
sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of
nonviolent suspects.”).
88. See id. at 9 (“The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of the
individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.”).
89. Id. at 10.
90. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
91. Id. at 388.
92. See id. at 388–89 (“[W]hen Graham entered the store, he saw a number
of people ahead of him in the check outline. Concerned about the delay, he hurried
out of the store and asked Berry to drive him to a friend’s house instead.”).
93. See id. at 389 (“Respondent Connor . . . saw Graham hastily enter and
leave the store. The officer became suspicious that something was amiss and
followed Berry’s car.”).
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backup, Graham exited the vehicle and passed out from low blood
sugar. 94
Other officers arrived on scene and helped Connor forcefully
detain Graham, ignoring Berry’s request that Graham be given
sugar while he was locked in the back seat of a patrol vehicle. 95
The officers eventually ascertained that Graham had done nothing
wrong at the convenience store, and they drove him home and
released him, but the encounter had still left Graham with a
broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured
shoulder. 96
The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
evaluated Graham’s excessive force claim under the four-part
substantive due process standard articulated by the Second Circuit
in Johnson v. Glick. 97 Concluding that Graham had failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that his substantive due process rights
had been violated, the district court ordered a directed verdict for
the City of Charlotte and Officer Connor, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 98
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “what
constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law
94. See id. (“[T]he officer ordered Berry and Graham to wait while he found
out what, if anything, had happened at the convenience store. . . . Graham got out
of the car, ran around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he passed
out briefly.”).
95. See id. (“Four officers grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the
police car. A friend of Graham’s brought some orange juice to the car, but the
officers refused to let him have it.”).
96. See id. at 390 (“[Graham] commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the individual officers involved in the incident . . . alleging that they had
used excessive force in making the investigatory stop . . . .”).
97. See id. at 390
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between that need
and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; and
(4) ‘[w]hether the force was applied in a[n] [ . . . ] effort to maintain and restore
discipline or [ . . . ] for the purpose of causing harm.’
(quoting Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986)).
98. See Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
(“The Court does not find, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, that there was excessive force used by the police officers rising to
the level of violation of his constitutional rights.”); see also Graham v. City of
Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 948–49 (4th Cir. 1987) (“We conclude, therefore, that the
district court did not use an erroneous legal standard when deciding whether
Graham’s case could withstand a motion for a directed verdict.”).
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enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.” 99 In
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority, the
Court determined that excessive force claims brought by free
citizens could no longer be evaluated under a substantive due
process standard, thereby overruling the Second Circuit in
Johnson v. Glick, 100 but must instead be assessed under a Fourth
Amendment standard of “objective reasonableness.” 101
The Court based its conclusion on the premise that an
excessive force claim must “isolate the precise constitutional
violation,” usually either under the Fourth or the Eighth
Amendment, and that the claim must be judged under a standard
particular to that amendment, rather than “some generalized
‘excessive force’ standard.” 102 According to the Court, free citizens’
claims of excessive force are more aptly characterized as invoking
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 103 After settling on
the superiority of the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court
stated that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case
is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” 104

99. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
100. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (“The solution
lies in the proposition that, both before and after sentence, constitutional
protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the specific
command of the Eighth Amendment . . . The same principle should extend to acts
of brutality by correctional officer . . . .”).
101. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, 392–93 (“The vast majority of lower federal
courts have applied [the] four-part ‘substantive due process’ test indiscriminately
to all excessive force claims . . . . without considering whether the particular
application of force might implicate a more specific constitutional right governed
by a different standard.”).
102. Id. at 394 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
103. See id. at 394–95 (determining that excessive force claims brought by
free citizens invoke the Fourth Amendment because the Garner Court focused its
analysis on the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim, not his substantive due
process claim) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985)).
104. Id. at 397.
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In 2015, the Supreme Court officially cemented the difference
between the excessive force standards applicable to pretrial
detainees and to incarcerated individuals. 105 In Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, Michael Kingsley was arrested and detained in a
Wisconsin county jail. 106 During the night, the guard on duty
noticed a piece of paper covering the light fixture above Kingsley’s
bed; the guard told Kingsley to remove the paper, but Kingsley
refused. 107 The next morning, following Kingsley’s repeated
refusals to remove the piece of paper, four officers approached
Kingsley’s cell and ordered him to stand up and back up to the cell
door with his hands behind him. 108 Kingsley refused to comply with
this order as well, and so the officers entered the cell, handcuffed
Kingsley, forcibly removed him to another cell, and placed him face
down on the cot with his hands still handcuffed behind his back. 109
The parties disputed what happened next, but the Court
described the scene as follows:
The officers testified that Kingsley resisted their efforts to
remove his handcuffs. Kingsley testified that he did not resist. All
agree that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his knee in Kingsley’s
back[,] and Kingsely told him in impolite language to get off.
Kingsley testified that Hendrickson and [Deputy Sheriff Fritz]
Degner then slammed his head into a concrete bunk—an
allegation the officers deny. 110
However, what was not in dispute was the fact that
Hendrickson told Degner to deploy a taser against Kingsley, and
that Degner did so for about five seconds while Kingsley was still
in handcuffs. 111
105. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015) (acknowledging
that the Court’s preference of an objective standard in excessive force claims could
raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in excessive force cases but
declining to address said questions).
106. Id. at 392.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 393.
111. See id. (“Degner applied a Taser to Kingsley’s back for approximately five
seconds; the officers then left the handcuffed Kingsley alone in the receiving cell;
and officers returned to the cell 15 minutes later and removed Kingsley’s
handcuffs.”).
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Following this ordeal, Kingsley brought a § 1983 action
against both Hendrickson and Degner in the Western District of
Wisconsin, claiming that the officers’ use of excessive force
deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 112
The jury found in favor of the officers after receiving the
instruction that Kingsley must have proven, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that “Defendants knew that using force presented
a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded
plaintiff’s safety . . . .” 113 On appeal before the Seventh Circuit,
Kingsley argued that the proper standard for an excessive force
claim brought by a pretrial detainee ought to be only whether the
officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable, but the panel
disagreed and affirmed the district court’s ruling. 114
In light of an existing circuit split, the Supreme Court granted
Kingsley’s petition to answer whether “the requirements of a
§ 1983 excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee must
satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective standard.” 115
In Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion, the Court abrogated
cases from the Second and Eleventh Circuits by holding that a
pretrial detainee need only to show that an officer’s conduct was
objectively unreasonable when bringing an excessive force claim
under § 1983. 116
112. See id. (summarizing the basis of Kingsley’s suit).
113. See id. (discussing the other requirements included in the jury
instructions: “(1) Defendants used force on plaintiff; (2) Defendants’ use of force
was unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at the time;” and “(4)
Defendants’ conduct caused some harm to plaintiff.”).
114. See id. at 394. (“The majority held that the law required a ‘subjective
inquiry’ into the officer’s state of mind. There must be ‘an actual intent to violate
[the plaintiff’s] rights or reckless disregard for his rights.’”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
115. Id. at 395. Compare, e.g., Murray v. Johnson No. 260, 367 F. App’x 196,
198 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a pretrial detainee must show both an objective
and subjective component in bringing an excessive force claim under § 1983), and
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (same), with
Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 865–66 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring only a showing
that the officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable in the context of
pretrial detainees) and Young v. Wolfe, 478 F. App’x 354, 356 (9th Cir. 2012)
(same).
116. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (announcing
the unreasonable standard and introducing a framework for evaluating
unreasonableness).
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The Court based its conclusion on several factors. 117 First, the
Court held that the application of a singular, objective standard for
claims brought by pretrial detainees was consistent with past
precedent in Graham v. Connor 118 and Bell v. Wolfish 119 which,
when viewed in tandem, held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protected pretrial detainees from
applications of force amounting to “punishment,” which itself could
consist of actions with an “express intent to punish,” but also could
consist of actions not “rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose” or “appear excessive in
relation to that purpose.” 120 Second, the application of a purely
objective standard was “workable” because it was “consistent with
the pattern jury instructions used in several Circuits,” and it
“adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith.” 121
III. Deliberate Indifference Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A second type of § 1983 action available to both convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees is a deliberate indifference
claim. 122 Similar to excessive force § 1983 actions, a deliberate
indifference petitioner faces a different standard depending on
whether they are a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. 123 To
sustain a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth
117. See id. at 397–99 (including consistency with precedent, practical
workability, and adequacy of protection for officers acting in good faith).
118. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 387, 397–99 (1989) (holding that an
excessive force claim brought by a pretrial detainee against a law enforcement
officer must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment).
119. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (determining that the issue
of whether a condition of confinement constitutes a deprivation of due process
must be answered by ascertaining whether the condition would constitute as a
punishment itself).
120. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397–98 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 387,
395 n.10 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, 561 (1979)).
121. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399.
122. See Purver & Hageman, supra note 35 (defining the contours of the claim
and providing sample pattern jury instructions as examples).
123. See Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2017)
(describing the two-prong standard for deliberate indifference claims brought
under the Eighth Amendment); see also Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The standard to find an individual deliberately
indifferent under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is less clear.”).
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Amendment, an incarcerated individual must show that she “had
serious medical needs, which is an objective inquiry, and that the
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs, which
is a subjective inquiry.” 124 However, for pretrial detainees, there is
a circuit split as to whether the Supreme Court’s holding in
Kingsley applies to all types of deliberate indifference claims
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. 125
A. Deliberate Indifference Claims Under the Eighth Amendment
In Farmer v. Brennan, 126 a transgender individual named Dee
Farmer was transferred for disciplinary reasons from the Federal
Correctional Institute in Oxford, Wisconsin (“FCI–Oxford”), to the
United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana (“USP–Terre
Haute”). 127 Upon her introduction into the general population at
USP–Terre Haute, Farmer was beaten and raped by another
prisoner while she was in her cell. 128
Farmer brought a claim under § 1983, alleging that the
respondents “either transferred [her] to USP–Terre Haute or
124. Heyer, 849 F.3d at 209–10 (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th
Cir. 2008)).
125. Compare Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir.
2016) (determining that the Court’s holding in Kingsley mandates that deliberate
indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees be evaluated under a purely
objective standard), with Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 961 F.3d 1311, 1318
n.4 (11th Cir. 2020) (determining that the Court’s decision in Kingsley does not
impact an analysis of a petitioner’s deliberate indifference claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment). Compare Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir.
2017) (adopting objective standard for deliberate indifference claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment), and Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 351–52
(7th Cir. 2018) (same), with Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d
415, 419 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (deciding not to overturn precedent evaluating Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment the same way), and Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 201469, 2020 WL 3867393, at *5 (6th Cir. July 9, 2020) (same).
126. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
127. See id. at 830 (“Though the record before us is unclear about the security
designations of the two prisons in 1989, penitentiaries are typically higher
security facilities that house more troublesome prisoners than federal
correctional institutes.”).
128. See id. (“After an initial stay in administrative segregation, [Farmer] was
placed in the USP–Terre Haute general population. [Farmer] voiced no objection
to any prison official about the transfer to the penitentiary or to placement in its
general population.”).
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placed [her] in its general population despite knowledge that the
penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate
assaults, and despite knowledge that [Farmer], as a [transgender
individual] who ‘projects feminine characteristics,’ would be
particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by some USP–Terre Haute
inmates.” 129 Thus, according to Farmer, the respondents’ actions
constituted a “deliberately indifferent failure to protect [her]
safety,” which violated her Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. 130 The District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the
respondents, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
“summarily affirmed without opinion.” 131
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the circuits
had adopted conflicting standards for what constitutes “deliberate
indifference.” 132 In an opinion authored by Justice Souter, the
Court held that a prison official is deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm to an incarcerated individual, thereby
violating that incarcerated individual’s Eighth Amendment rights,
whenever that official is subjectively aware of that risk. 133
Beginning with Estelle v. Gamble, 134 which established that
“deliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence,” but less than “acts or omissions for the very purpose
of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result,” the
Court traced the history of its use of the term “deliberate
indifference.” 135 Additionally, the Court pointed out that the term
“recklessness” was not particularly “self-defining,” making the

129. Id. at 830–31.
130. See id. at 831 (“[Farmer] sought compensatory and punitive damages,
and an injunction barring future confinement in any penitentiary, including
USP–Terre Haute.”).
131. Id. at 832.
132. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Compare McGill v. Duckworth, 944
F.2d 344, 348 (CA7 1991) (holding that “deliberate indifference” requires a
“subjective standard of recklessness”), with Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360–
361 (CA3 1992) (“[A] prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or
should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate”).
133. See id. at 828 (summarizing the Court’s decision).
134. See generally, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
135. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1994).
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federal circuits’ history of equivocating deliberate indifference with
recklessness problematic. 136
Farmer asked the Court to establish a purely objective test for
deliberate indifference, but the Court declined to do so, holding
instead “that a prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 137 According to the
Court, this conclusion was required by both the Constitution and
its past precedent; it was not the result of the Court “merely . .
. parsing of the phrase ‘deliberate indifference.’” 138
B. Deliberate Indifference Claims Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
In Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 139 Jonathan Castro was
arrested by officers of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department for
public drunkenness and placed into a “sobering cell.” 140 Later that
evening, another individual arrested on a felony charge, Jonathan
Gonzales, was placed in the sobering cell with Castro. 141 Almost
immediately afterwards, Castro began banging on the cell door in
an attempt to summon help, but no one responded; about twenty
minutes later, however, an unpaid community volunteer walked
by the cell and saw that “Castro appeared to be asleep and that
Gonzales was ‘inappropriately’ touching Castro’s thigh.” 142 The
volunteer summoned the station supervisor, Christopher Solomon,
136. See id. at 836 (discussing how “acting or failing to act with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent
of recklessly disregarding that risk. That does not, however, fully answer the
pending question about the level of culpability deliberate indifference
entails . . . .”).
137. See id. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”).
138. Id. at 840.
139. See generally, Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.
2015).
140. Id. at 1064–65.
141. See id. (explaining the events that happened after Castro’s arrest).
142. Id. at 1065.
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and when Solomon reached the cell six minutes later, he found
Gonzales stomping on Castro’s head, which was surrounded by a
pool of blood. 143 By the time the paramedics had reached the
station, Castro was unconscious and in respiratory distress. 144
Castro brought suit against the County of Los Angeles and the
Sherriff’s Department (“entity defendants”), as well as Solomon
and Solomon’s supervisor (“individual defendants”), asserting that
the defendants had deprived him of his constitutional rights by
putting him in a cell with Gonzalez and failing to properly monitor
the cell. 145 The defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter
of law on the following grounds: “(1) insufficient evidence that the
design of a jail cell constitutes a policy, practice, or custom by the
County that resulted in a constitutional violation; (2) insufficient
evidence that a reasonable officer would have known that housing
Castro and Gonzales together was a violation of Castro’s
constitutional rights; and (3) insufficient evidence for the jury to
award punitive damages.” 146 The federal district court denied the
motion, and a jury awarded Castro more than two million dollars
in damages; on appeal, a three-judge panel affirmed the district
court’s ruling as to Solomon and Solomon’s supervisor, but
reversed the judgments against the County of Los Angeles and the
Sherriff’s Department. 147 However, a majority of active judges in
the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Castro’s case en banc. 148
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. 149
In Judge Susan Graber’s opinion, the court spent a substantial
amount of time discussing the potential applicability of the
143. See id. (stating what occurred six minutes after the volunteer reported
to Solomon).
144. See id. (“[Castro] was hospitalized for almost a month, after which he
was transferred to a long-term care facility, where he remained for four years. He
suffers from severe memory loss and other cognitive difficulties.”).
145. See id. at 1065 (“Castro claimed that both the entity defendants and the
individual defendants violated his constitutional rights by housing him in the
sobering cell with Gonzalez and by failing to maintain appropriate supervision of
the cell.”).
146. Id. at 1065–66.
147. See id. at 1066 (describing the case’s procedural posture) (citing Castro
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015)).
148. See id. (stating how the case reached the Ninth Circuit).
149. See id. at 1078 (reporting the court’s decision).
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Supreme Court’s holding in Kingsley 150 to Castro’s failure-toprotect claim. 151 The court confirmed that both pretrial detainees
and incarcerated individuals may bring a failure-to-protect claim
by showing that the facility officials acted with “deliberate
indifference.” 152 However, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that while
the deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment
contains both an objective and a subjective component, the
“standard to find an individual deliberately indifferent under the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, is less clear.” 153
Previously, in Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 154 the
Ninth Circuit had held that Supreme Court’s decisions in Farmer
v. Brennan 155 and Bell v. Wolfish 156 mandated that the deliberate
indifference standard have both an objective and a subjective
component. 157 Specifically, the court determined that Bell
“require[d] proof of punitive intent for failure-to-protect claims,
whether those claims arise in a pretrial or post-conviction context,”
and that Farmer necessitated that “[a]n official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 158
However, Judge Graber and the majority of the Ninth Circuit
used the Supreme Court’s Kingsley 159 decision to overturn their

150. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (holding that
within the excessive force context, a pretrial detainee need only demonstrate that
the force used against her was objectively unreasonable).
151. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068–73 (9th Cir.
2015) (explaining the opinion’s structure).
152. Id. at 1067–68.
153. Id. at 1068.
154. 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010).
155. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
156. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
157. See Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir.
2010) (providing what the circuit held previously).
158. Id. at 1242 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)).
159. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (holding that
there cannot be a singular, “deliberate indifference” standard for all § 1983
claims, meaning that the evaluative standard for excessive force claims may vary
depending on whether the petitioner is a pre-trial detainee or a convicted
prisoner).
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previous ruling in Clouthier. 160 The Ninth Circuit determined the
underlying rationale in the Supreme Court’s Kingsley decision was
applicable to Castro’s failure-to protect claims. 161 The Ninth
Circuit reached this conclusion for several reasons. 162 First, the
court noted that the text § 1983 “contains no state-of-mind
requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of
the underlying federal right.” 163 Second, a pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claim stems from the same constitutional
protection as a pretrial detainee’s failure-to-protect claim: the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 164 Lastly, the court
observed that the Supreme Court did not limit its holding in
Kingsley to excessive force claims, but rather it applied to any
“challenged governmental action [that] is not rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective or that is excessive in relation
to that purpose.” 165
Considering all these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the jury’s verdict against the individual defendants,
because the record contained sufficient evidence that a “reasonable
officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high

160. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“Under Kingsley, then, it does not matter whether the defendant understood that
the force used was excessive, or intended it to be excessive, because the standard
is purely objective. In so holding, the Kingsley Court expressly rejected the
interpretation of Bell on which we had relied in Clouthier.”) (internal citations
omitted).
161. See id. at 1070 (“On balance, we are persuaded that Kingsley applies, as
well, to failure-to-protect claims brought by pretrial detainees against individual
defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment. Excessive force applied directly by
an individual jailer and force applied by a fellow inmate can cause the same
injuries, both physical and constitutional.”).
162. See id. at 1069–70 (“[T]here are significant reasons to hold that the
objective standard [established in Kingsley] applies to failure-to-protect claims as
well.”).
163. Id. at 1069 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See id. (“The underlying federal right, as well as the nature of the harm
suffered, is the same for pretrial detainees’ excessive force and failure-to-protect
claims. Both categories of claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause[.]”).
165. Id. at 1070 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398).
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degree of risk involved and that the officers’ failure to take
reasonable measure to protect Castro caused his injuries.” 166
However, not every federal appellate circuit has taken the
same position as the Ninth Circuit did in Castro. 167 In Strain v.
Regalado, 168 the Tenth Circuit declined to extend Kingsley to a pretrial detainee’s deliberate indifference claim. 169 There, on
December 11, 2015, Thomas Pratt began showing symptoms of
alcohol withdrawal while being held pretrial at the Tulsa County
Jail. 170 Upon Pratt’s request for detox medication, one of the
facility’s nurses performed a drug and alcohol withdrawal
assessment, showing that Pratt “habitually drank fifteen-totwenty beers per day for the past decade.” 171 The jail subsequently
put Pratt on a seizure precaution, requiring that his vital signs be
checked every eight hours, and he was also prescribed Librium “to
treat his alcohol withdrawal symptoms.” 172
Several days later, on December 14, Nurse Patricia Deane
noticed that Pratt was showing the typical symptoms of delirium
tremens: “[V]omiting, severe tremors, acute panic states, and
disorientation.” 173 Despite the severity of Pratt’s symptoms, Nurse
Dean did not contact a physician or take Pratt’s vitals, and she
chose to switch Pratt from Librium to Valium. 174 Additionally, the
166. Id. at 1072.
167. Compare Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (adopting
objective standard for all deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2018)
(same), with Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4
(5th Cir. 2017) (deciding not to overturn precedent by evaluating claims under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments the same way), and Cameron v.
Bouchard, No. 20-1469, 2020 WL 3867393, at *5 (6th Cir. July 9, 2020) (same).
168. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 2020).
169. See id. at 993 (“At no point did Kingsley pronounce its application to
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims or otherwise state that we
should adopt a purely objective standard for such claims, so we cannot overrule
our precedent on this issue.”).
170. See id. at 987 (noting that Mr. Pratt expressed that he was experiencing
alcohol withdrawal the morning after he was booked).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 987–88.
173. Id. at 988.
174. See id. (“But someone, presumably a nurse practitioner at the request of
Nurse Deane, switched Mr. Pratt from Librium to Valium shortly after Nurse
Deane’s assessment.”).
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staff declined to increase Pratt’s level of care or move him to a
medical facility. 175 A few hours later, Dr. Curtis McElroy examined
Pratt, noticing a “two-centimeter” cut on his forehead and a pool of
blood on the cell floor. 176 Pratt’s level of care remained the same,
even after Dr. McElroy and licensed professional counselor, Kathy
Loehr, each gave Pratt a mental health examination. 177 On
December 16, a correctional officer noticed Pratt lying motionless
and called a nurse who “initiated cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.” 178 Pratt was taken to the hospital after he went into
cardiac arrest, and upon his discharge, he was diagnosed with a
“seizure disorder and other ailments that left him permanently
disabled.” 179
Pratt’s guardian, Plaintiff Faye Strain, brought an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the staff at the Tulsa County
Jail acted deliberately indifferent to Pratt’s medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 180 The federal district
court dismissed the suit and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claims. 181
Judge Joel Carson III, writing for the three-member panel,
specifically declined to apply Kingsley to Pratt’s deliberate
indifference claims on three separate grounds. 182 First, application
175. See id. (“[S]taff did not escalate Mr. Pratt’s level or place of care.”).
176. See id. (explaining what Dr. McElroy observed while examining Pratt
and noting that Dr. McElroy was aware of Pratt’s earlier symptoms from his
medical records).
177. See id. (“Mr. Pratt reported that he was detoxing from alcohol and
appeared shaky. LPC Loehr observed that Mr. Pratt struggled to answer
questions and determined the cut on his forehead appeared unintentional. LPC
Loehr declined to seek more care for Mr. Pratt.”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. (explaining Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and that pretrial detainees
have access to that claim under the Fourteenth Amendment).
181. See Strain v. Regalado, No. 18-CV-583-TCK-FHM, 2019 WL 3646828, at
*7 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2019) (“[T]he Complaint in this case suffers the same fatal
flaw as the Amended Complaint . . . . [A]lthough the allegations arguably state a
claim for negligence, they do no[t] establish that [D]efendants intentionally
denied or delay access to treatment or intentionally interfered with the treatment
once prescribed.”).
182. See Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 991 (10th Cir. 2020)
First, Kingsley turned on considerations unique to excessive force claims: whether
the use of force amounted to punishment, not on the status of the detainee. Next,

IT JUST MAKES SENSE

253

of the Kinglsey standard would be inappropriate because excessive
force and deliberate indifference claims serve different purposes,
even though they are both protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 183 Second, according to the court, the
notion of “deliberate indifference” itself presupposes a subjective
component. 184 Lastly, application of the Kingsley standard would
violate the principle of stare decisis in the Tenth Circuit and the
Supreme Court’s rejection of a purely objective standard in Farmer
v. Brennan. 185 For these three reasons, the panel affirmed the
district court’s holding. 186
Similarly, in Grochowski v. Clayton County, 187 the Eleventh
Circuit also declined to apply Kingsley to a deliberate indifference
claim brought by the children of a pretrial detainee who died in
custody. 188 On August 14, 2012, Kenneth Grochowski was killed by

the nature of a deliberate indifference claim infers a subjective component.
Finally, principles of stare decisis weigh against overruling precedent to extend a
Supreme Court holding to a new context or new category of claims.
183. See id. (“The excessive force cause of action ‘protects a pretrial detainee
from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.’ The deliberate
indifference cause of action does not relate to punishment, but rather safeguards
a pretrial detainee’s access to adequate medical care.”) (internal citations
omitted).
184. See id. at 992 (“[D]eliberate indifference requires an official to
subjectively disregard a known or obvious, serious medical need. . . . An excessive
force claim, on the other hand, does not consider an official’s state of mind with
respect to the proper interpretation of the force.’”) (quoting Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015)) (emphasis in original).
185. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (establishing that the
test for deliberate indifference requires an official to subjectively disregard a
known or obvious, serious medical need); see also Strain, 977 F.3d at 993 (“‘We
reaffirm that if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other lines of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 237 (1997)).
186. See id. at 997 (“Although Plaintiff’s claims may smack of negligence, we
conclude that they fail to rise to the high level of deliberate indifference against
any Defendant. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s federal
claims in full.”).
187. Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 961 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2020).
188. See id. at 1318 n.4 (“Plaintiffs urge us to dispense with the subjective
component, as the Supreme Court did in Kingsley v. Hendrickson for excessive
force claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. We decline to apply
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his cellmate, William Brooks, during a fight over a piece of candy;
ironically, neither individual had a history of violent felonies or
were currently detained for a violent offense. 189 Brooks physically
assaulted Grochowski until he was unconscious and then
attempted to drown the lifeless man in their cell toilet. 190
Grochowski was unresponsive when officials for the Clayton
County Jail attempted to help him, and he “was pronounced dead
the following morning.” 191
Grochowski’s living relatives brought a civil rights action
under § 1983, claiming that Grochowski’s due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by the jail officials’
and Clayton County’s actions. 192 Specifically, Grochowski’s estate
asserted that the jail officials were liable themselves because both
the jail’s inmate classification process and its practice of
performing rounds only hourly to supervise inmates were
inadequate. 193 As to Clayton County itself, the estate argued two
additional theories of liability: (1) “the jail’s design pose[d] a
substantial risk of harm to inmates at the Jail because corrections
officers do not have a clear view into each cell from the central
control towers”; and (2) “the County failed to fund the Jail
adequately . . . caus[ing] the Jail to close one of its housing units
Kingsley because Grochowski’s death occurred in 2012 and Kingsley was decided
in 2015.”).
189. See id. at 1314 (“Neither man had a history of violent felonies, and
neither reported any mental health issues. Both men were classified as mediumsecurity inmates and were assigned to the same cell.”). But see id. at 1317
(“Plaintiffs point out, however, that Brooks had been convicted in 2009 for
misdemeanor fighting, which was not considered under the security screening
protocol.”).
190. See id. at 1317 (“According to Brooks, Grochowski took a swing at Brooks,
and Brooks blocked the swing and hit Grochowski in the throat. Brooks continued
to beat Grochowski and then tried to drown Grochowski by placing his head into
the cell’s toilet.”).
191. Id.
192. See id. (“Plaintiffs argued that the conditions at the jail violated
Grochowski’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
those conditions caused Grochowski’s death.”).
193. See id. at 1318 (“[T]he Jail’s classification process does not adequately
identify inmates with violent or assaultive tendencies, which leads to nonviolent
inmates being double-celled with violent inmates[,] . . . [and] the Jail’s practice of
performing hourly rounds is insufficient to ensure the safety of inmates while
they are inside their cells.”).

IT JUST MAKES SENSE

255

. . . pos[ing] a substantial risk of harm to inmates at the Jail.” 194
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
jail officials were not liable on qualified immunity grounds, and
that the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York 195 absolved Clayton County of liability
for any potential constitutional violations. 196 The district court
granted the motions for summary judgment. 197
The three-member Eleventh Circuit panel, in an opinion
written by Circuit Judge David Ebel, affirmed the district court
and held that the actions of the jail officials in Clayton County had
not violated Grochowski’s due process rights. 198 Regarding the jail
officials themselves, the court determined that the officials’
implementation of the inmate classification process did not violate
Grochowski’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, since there was no
showing that the classification process neglected to properly
contemplate an inmate’s capacity for violence. 199 Additionally, the
court found that the jail officials’ practice of performing hourly
rounds did not create an increased risk of serious harm to inmates,
as there was no constitutionally-mandated requirement that cells
be checked more frequently than every hour. 200
194. Id. at 1321–22.
195. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)
(“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy
or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.”).
196. See Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 961 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir.
2020) (moving for summary judgement based on qualified immunity grounds).
197. See id. (noting that the district court granted summary judgement for
the jail supervisors and the county while denying partial summary judgement in
favor of the plaintiff).
198. See id. at 1319–23 (affirming the district court’s order granting the jail
supervisors and the county’s Motion for Summary Judgment).
199. See id. at 1319–20 (“A corrections officer then conducts a security
screening based on objective criteria, such as the inmate’s current charges,
history of violent felony convictions, and any disciplinary records from previous
detentions at the Jail.”).
200. See id. at 1320 (“To the contrary, the Jail Supervisors cite cases to
demonstrate that hourly rounds are constitutionally adequate . . . . We recognize
that [these cited cases] addressed the subjective component of deliberate
indifference rather than the objective component of a substantial risk of serious
harm.”).
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As to the claims against Clayton County itself, the Eleventh
Circuit first held that the design of the jail itself was not
constitutionally inadequate because its design was consistent with
national standards and each cell had an emergency call button. 201
The court also determined that there was no showing that the
County’s funding and staffing scheme for the jail fell below a
minimum constitutional threshold that would create a risk of
substantial harm to every inmate housed within the jail. 202
On November 20, 2020, Grochowski’s estate filed a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 203 The
petition listed three questions for review based on the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision not to apply the Kingsley standard to
Grochowski’s deliberate indifference claims. 204 The first question
was whether the courts below “failed to draw inferences in
Grochowski’s favor erroneously finding each condition did not
present a substantial risk of harm, and by failing to consider the
combination of the conditions, erroneously granting the jail
supervisors qualified immunity and the County judgment, finding
the conditions did not pose a substantial risk.” 205 The second
question posited was whether “Kingsley’s objective reasonableness
test apply to the conditions and systems creating an unreasonable
risk of harm to detainees, warranting denial of summary
judgment.” 206 The third and final question was whether
“legislative immunity [should] shield a County representative from
a deposition.” 207 However, on January 25, 2021, the Supreme
201. See id. at 1321 (“Plaintiffs’ position amounts to an argument that the
constitution requires continuous observation of double-celled inmates. As
described above, our precedent undermines that suggestion.”).
202. See id. at 1321–22 (explaining that there was no evidence that the jail
was forced to place three prisoners in a single cell due to the housing closure, nor
that extra housing would have led to Grochowski being placed in a cell by
himself).
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit, Grochowski v.
Clayton Cnty., Ga., No. 20-738, 2020 WL 7033465 (Nov. 19, 2020) (petitioning the
Supreme Court to overturn the decision of the Eleventh Circuit).
204. See id. at i. (“Kingsley v. Hendrickson . . . as applied in three other
circuits, would apply an objective reasonableness test to remediate the conditions
and systems creating a substantial risk of harm to Clayton detainees.”).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Court denied certiorari to Grochowski’s estate, meaning that the
circuit split surrounding the application of the Kingsley standard
to deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees will
remain unresolved for the immediate future. 208
IV. Analysis of Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Claims
The following section of this Note seeks to create a
rudimentary measure of pretrial detainees’ varying rates of
success in brining deliberate indifference claims. In 2017,
Professor Joanna C. Schwartz wrote an article published in the
Yale Law Journal entitled How Qualified Immunity Fails. 209 In
that article, Professor Schwartz examined the dockets of cases
involving qualified immunity from the Southern District of Texas,
the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of Ohio, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of
California over the course of a two-year period, from January 1,
2011 to December 31, 2012; she then measured a number of
different outcomes, including the frequency of defendants bringing
qualified immunity motions, whether the courts would grant those
motions, and whether those motions were dispositive of the case
either at the Rule 12 or the Rule 56 stage. 210 Upon review of the
1,183 dockets across the five federal districts, Professor Schwartz
found that “just thirty-eight (3.9%) of the 979 cases in which
qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed on qualified
immunity grounds.” 211 Additionally, when the data set was
expanded to include all § 1983 cases against law enforcement
defendants, Professor Schwartz discovered that only seven (0.6%)
cases and thirty-one (2.6%) cases were dismissed at the Rule 12
and Rule 56 stages, respectively, on qualified immunity
grounds. 212

208. See Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 2021 WL 231575 at *1 (Jan. 25,
2021) (denying the petition for a writ of certiorari).
209. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2
(2017).
210. See id. at 19 (explaining the article’s methodology).
211. Id. at 2.
212. See id at 10 (summarizing the data reviewed by Professor Schwartz).
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In light of Professor Schwartz’s article, I thought that it would
be interesting to go through a similar empirical process and
evaluate the successfulness of pretrial detainees’ deliberate
indifference claims under § 1983. Realizing the limitations placed
on this process by Bloomberg Law, I turned to that service’s
Litigation Analytics tool, and I looked at the motion outcomes
decided in 2020 for every case involving “Prisoners’ Rights” in both
the Northern District of Alabama and the Northern District of
California. I chose these two federal district courts as
representatives of each side of the circuit split mentioned above. 213
Within Bloomberg’s Litigation Analytics tool, there are three
different types of motion outcomes: Granted, Denied, and
Granted/Denied in Part. There was a total of twenty-nine motions
in the Northern District of Alabama and ninety-one in the
Northern District of California.
Out of the twenty-nine total cases involving prisoners’ rights
in the Northern District of Alabama, only five (17%) dealt with
deliberate indifference claims brought by a pretrial detainee. Of
those five cases, four were adjudicated at the Rule 12 stage, with
only one being determined at the Rule 56 stage. Within these five
cases themselves, there were a total of seven individual motions.
Three motions were granted (43%), two were denied (29%), and
three were granted in part and denied in part (43%).
In the Northern District of California, seventeen out of ninetyone (19%) cases dealt with deliberate indifference claims brought
by a pretrial detainee. Out of those seventeen cases, nine were
determined at the Rule 12 stage and eight were determined at the
Rule 56 stage. Again, within these seventeen cases, there were a
total of eighteen individual motions, with six being granted (33%),
thirteen being granted in part and denied in part (77%), and only
one being flat out denied (6%).
From these rudimentary calculations, pretrial detainees
clearly have a better chance of surviving either a motion to dismiss
213. Compare Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir.
2016) (determining that Court’s holding Kingsley mandates that deliberate
indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees be evaluated under a purely
objective standard), with Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 961 F.3d 1311, 1318
n.4 (11th Cir. 2020) (determining that the Court’s decision in Kingsley does not
impact an analysis of a petitioner’s deliberate indifference claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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or a motion for summary judgment when facing a purely objective
standard in the Ninth Circuit as compared to a subjective standard
in the Eleventh Circuit. 214
V. Conclusion
Based on the research described in the previous section, 215
pretrial detainees bringing deliberate indifference claims in the
Ninth Circuit, when facing a purely objective standard, have a
higher chance of successfully making it trial than their
counterparts in the Eleventh Circuit. From this position, it is not
hard to draw the logical conclusion that incarcerated individuals
bringing excessive force or deliberate indifference claims under the
Eighth Amendment would be more successful if facing only an
objective standard as well. While the Supreme Court has made its
case as to why the subjective component is necessary when the
Eighth Amendment is implicated, 216 is the basis for this
justification, that individuals who have not been convicted in a
court of law cannot be subject to “punishment,” worth the
increased burden on incarcerated individuals? This legal point
seems rather esoteric as free citizens, pretrial detainees, and
incarcerated individuals alike are “punished” today because of the
color of their skin, even though that punishment was not handed
down by a court of law. 217 Nevertheless, external interventions into

214. This statistical analysis is subject to a number of limitations. First,
neither sample size is large enough to be statistically significant. Second, even if
the sample sizes were large enough, the results would have to assume that the
parties in these cases always engage in dispositive motion practice. Third, these
numbers might not be uniform over the entire circuit. Fourth, “user error” could
contribute to percentages reported above. The purpose of the exercise is really to
demonstrate that more robust research is needed in this area.
215. See supra Part III (analyzing deliberate indifference claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
216. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991) (“These cases
mandate into a prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.”).
217. See, e.g., Tim Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, & Jay Senter, Three
Former Officers Are Convicted of Violating George Floyd’s Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb. 24, 2022) (“The case was an extraordinarily rare example of the
Justice Department prosecuting officers for their inaction while another officer
used excessive force.”) [https://perma.cc/6GJ9-KFLU].
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the treatment of incarcerated individuals might provide some
provide some relief in the not-so-distant future. 218

218. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:20–cv01971-JHE (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2020) (“The State of Alabama violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of [ ] prisoners . . . by failing to protect these
prisoners from the use of excessive force by security staff . . . .”).

